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Note 
As a white person, I have not directly experienced the harmful effects of police surveillance and 
violence. The violence and harm perpetrated by police in this country disproportionately affects 
communities of color, particularly endangering the lives of young black and brown men. As 
someone who is committed to anti-violence practices and harm reduction, I wanted to learn 
about how to disrupt one of the most prolific, yet ignored, types of violence that occurs in this 
country: the violence of the untouchables, the American police. This being said, my positionality 
as a white person means that my argument will not address all facets of the lived experiences of 
those who are most subjected to police violence. I embrace, and preemptively appreciate the 
future extensions of this crucial conversation. 
It would also be paradoxical of me to write a thesis on violence, particularly white 
heteropatriarchal violence, without acknowledging the violence that occurred and occurs against 
Indigenous peoples on the land upon which Vassar presently occupies. Vassar College is situated 
on Delaware Lenni Lenape Nation, and Stockbridge-Munsee Mohican lands, lands seized 
through genocidal tactics of displacement by white colonists. The Delaware people today live 
across North America, but are largely concentrated in Oklahoma and Ontario, Canada as a result 
of their forced migration. The Stockbridge-Munsee Mohican people are also spread across North 
America today, but presently, most live in northeastern Wisconsin. Colonial violence inflicted 
against the Indigenous people of this land is rarely spoken about, and if spoken about, is 
discussed in the past tense. In order to live non-violently, we (particularly the white we) must 
commit to resisting systemic oppression and colonial practices and commit to standing in 
solidarity with Indigenous movements for self-determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction  
Despite directly threatening everyone's health, violence has historically been viewed not 
as a public health crisis, but as a problem of individual crime. This emphasis on individuality 
removes collective responsibility from working towards eradicating violence. Moreover, 
currently, in the United States (US), violence has mostly been “controlled” by punitive measures, 
due to the belief that violent action is one’s independent, moralistic problem, the result of 
someone being “bad” or “evil,” when truly, it is a societal problem that can be prevented if 
treated as such.1 Over the course of this thesis, I will be arguing that violence is an infectious 
disease, and furthermore, that police violence is synonymous with gang violence and needs to be 
eradicated with equal vigor as all other types of violence. 
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition of violence encapsulates the scope 
of violent action: physical, sexual, psychological, and deprivation-based. Their 1996 definition 
of violence is as follows:  
“The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or 
has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation.”2 
 
Research has demonstrated that violence is caused by many factors, most prominently factors 
that emerge as a result of systemic oppression. These social, cultural, and economic experiences, 
as well as interactions with one’s family, community, and persons in power, contribute to one’s 
exposure to and interactions with violence.3 
 
1Linda L. Dahlberg and Etienne G. Krug, “Violence - a Global Public Health Problem,” in World Report on 
Violence and Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002), 17. 
2 “Definition and Typology of Violence,” World Health Organization (Violence Prevention Alliance, November 21, 
2011). 
3 Dahlberg and Krug, “Violence - a Global Public Health Problem,” 3.  
  
Violence is a leading cause of death in the US. Every hour, seven people die a violent 
death.4 Despite homicide being the third leading cause of death for people between the ages of 
one and forty-five, there have been no nation-wide, collective public health efforts to alleviate 
this.5 Exposure to any violence increases one’s risk of enduring negative health experiences 
throughout their lives, resulting in higher morbidity and mortality rates, leading to lost life-years, 
illnesses, homelessness, poverty, lack of education, and more.6 Financially speaking, in the US, 
an estimated $90 billion are lost every year because of medical care reacting to violent situations 
and lost work.7 While acknowledging this is a massive amount of money that could go toward 
anti-violence work, it is also important to discuss the indirect and intangible costs of 
experiencing violence, manifesting in reduced work performance or lower quality of life, and 
increased feelings and actions of suicidality.8 Making this crisis even more difficult to address, a 
violence-free world appears to be unattainable in society today. The media has normalized 
almost all aspects of violent acts, broadcasting events such as war footage and school shootings, 
all which end up infiltrating movies and video games. Violence is everywhere and it has been 
assimilated to fit into our everyday media consumption, and it is imperative, though difficult, to 
recognize its omnipresence and to work diligently to change the current narrative around it.9 
Currently, the US is employing a combination of law enforcement (also referred to as 
policing, or police, throughout this thesis) and incarceration to address violence. These systems 
are not only failing but are also reproducing environments that lead to violence. As of March 
 
4 “National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, November 7, 2019). 
5 “Addressing Violence as a Health Crisis with Health Methods,” (Cure Violence Global, January 2017). 
6 Dahlberg and Krug, “Violence - a Global Public Health Problem,” 17. 
7 “National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
8 Dahlberg and Krug, “Violence - a Global Public Health Problem,” 18. 
9  Ibid., 17.  
  
2020, the American carceral system holds 2.3 million people; “Every year, over 600,000 people 
enter prison gates, but people go to jail 10.6 million times each year.”10 
         Community-centered and community-specific public health initiatives have several 
documented successes of disrupting patterns of violence. One organization in particular, Cure 
Violence, uses an adaptation of a public health model for treating infectious diseases in order to 
reduce violent incidents and tendencies in the communities it works within. I will be analyzing 
Cure Violence’s approach and successes in my final chapter. 
         The first chapter of my thesis will argue that violence should be considered and treated as 
an infectious disease, as well as why that designation is important and is foundational for 
enacting a public health response. The second chapter will be discussing social network theory, 
exemplifying how violence travels like an infectious disease through tightly-knit networks. In 
this chapter, I will also be arguing that police violence mirrors gang violence in order to set the 
stage for asserting that police violence should be treated with a public health model. The third 
chapter will provide evidence to set the precedent that police and prisons are failing and are 
harmful, thus inadequate systems to address and prevent violence. In my last chapter, I will 
present a general public health model for responding to infectious diseases. Data and analyses 
from Cure Violence’s initial program, CeaseFire Chicago, will demonstrate the successes of 
using a public health model to address violence. In the conclusion of my final chapter, I will 
hypothesize how the Cure Violence model can be adapted to address police violence, particularly 
responding to and preventing police homicides and other acts of violence. My conclusion will 
discuss ideas and expressions of community care and accountability as steps to move forward. 
 
10 Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020,” Prison Policy Initiative, March 24, 
2020. 
  
Chapter 1: Violence as an Infectious Behavior 
Introduction: Healthfulness and Disease 
Disease and the concept of disease are ever-changing, ever-growing entities. When asked 
to define disease, in lay, non-scientific terms, I think of the opposite of health. Then I ask, how is 
health defined? What does it mean to be healthy? Can there be just one definition? Furthermore, 
how do we create an intersectional definition, when definitions of both healthfulness and illness 
differ greatly from culture to culture, “var[ying] with class, gender, ethnic group and less 
obvious factors…”11 Social context is incredibly important in crafting this definition, and it is 
necessary to acknowledge that societies in the global North have the tendency to over-
pathologize conditions of the mind and body. While researching various definitions of health and 
healthfulness, I was drawn to the World Health Organization’s 1946 definition. The WHO’s 
definition has been deemed “wildly utopian,” but I believe its holistic nature is something to be 
strived for. 12 They define health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”13 In 2020, this may seem impossible or 
outlandish. Even so, I think it is important to reach for goals as ideal and romantic as this one: 
for every person to have a right to a state of well-being, however they may describe it. 
Deriving from the WHO’s definition of health, disease can be defined as divergence from 
a state of healthfulness, as anything hindering a person’s or population’s experience of well-
being. If something alien is introduced to the body, disease can possibly develop. The alien agent 
can be biological or social, essentially any entity that derails the body from operating the way it 
did before the agent was introduced. In this chapter, I am arguing that violence is an infectious 
disease, detracting from the health and well-being of anyone infected by it.  
 
11 Jackie Leach Scully. “What Is a Disease?” EMBO Reports 5, no. 7 (July 2004), 650. 
12 Ibid., 650. 
13 WHO (1946) Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization. WHO, New York, USA. 
  
Characteristics and Treatments of Non-Communicable and Infectious Diseases 
Biologically, diseases are classified as either non-communicable or communicable 
(infectious). Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are often chronic and tend to progress slowly. 
As described by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), they do not “resolve 
spontaneously” and complete cures are “rarely achieved.”14 Risk factors that lead to NCDs 
include, but are not limited to, hereditary characteristics, environmental exposure, or “personal 
behavioral risks,” such as smoking, physical inactivity, or excessive consumption of alcohol.15 
The four main types of NCDs, according to the WHO, are cardiovascular diseases, cancer, 
chronic respiratory diseases, and diabetes.16 Non-communicable diseases “do not result from an 
acute infectious process” and therefore cannot be transmitted to others. 
Infectious diseases vary greatly from NCDs as they develop from an initial infection, 
though not all infections lead to disease.17 People can contract infections after direct or indirect 
contact with an infectious agent being carried by various vectors, such as humans, non-human 
animals, plants, or microbes.18,19 The infectious agents are can be classified as pathogenic 
microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, and protozoa, which enter the body after contact with 
the vector. Once infected, the body’s immune system is triggered and engages mechanisms to 
expel the infection. Certain immune-specific cells and antibodies are “released into the blood and 
 
14 “Overview of Noncommunicable Diseases and Related Risk Factors,” Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sept. 11, 2013.  
15 Ibid. 
16 “10 Facts on Noncommunicable Diseases,” World Health Organization. World Health Organization, March 29, 
2014. 
*NCDs are also discussed as diseases that can be remedied with public health efforts, as many are a byproduct of 
engaging in behaviors made necessary for survival due to poverty perpetuated by systemic racism, classism, sexism, 
and other oppressive systems. 
17 M. Drexler, “How Infection Works” in What You Need to Know About Infectious Disease (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2010).  
18 CA Janeway Jr., P Travers, M Walport et al., “Infectious agents and how they cause disease,” Chapter 10 in 
Immunobiology: The Immune System in Health and Disease, 5th edition. (New York: Garland Science, 2001).  
19 “Contagious Disease Definition,” National Institutes of Health (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), 
accessed December 2019. 
  
recruited to the site of infection,” where the infection can be contained and oftentimes 
eliminated.20 Sometimes, however, the adaptive immune response is weakened by the infection, 
and the infection persists in a latent form. This is typically where diseases arise: when the 
immune system can no longer sufficiently respond to the infection due to its rapid mutation and 
outmaneuvering of the typical defense mechanisms. These infections cause the most damage by 
interrupting normal cell functioning, for example, by releasing toxic products into the cell. By 
disrupting cell functioning and destroying masses of cells, the infection persists in the body as a 
disease, and infectious agents are readily transmittable to whomever or whatever comes into 
contact with the now infected individual. 
Non-communicable disease treatment varies according to diagnosis. If possible, NCDs 
are treated, and if there is no cure, palliative care is given to those in need.21 Oftentimes, there is 
ongoing research striving to identify a source and a solution; the urgency at which this research 
is approached is typically correlated to the temporal progression of the disease and the number of 
people affected. As NCDs are highly associated with environmental and behavioral factors, 
public health interventions are enacted to minimize public risks and modify environments as 
much as possible to increase accessibility to cleaner air, safer water, and healthier foods, as well 
as increase access to affordable, appropriate medical care.22  
Infectious diseases are often treated with much more urgency than NCDs, as they are able 
to spread, infect, and debilitate large populations very quickly. Health workers act quickly to 
control the spread of the disease to minimize the size of the outbreak, oftentimes isolating 
 
20 Janeway Jr. et al., “Infectious agents and how they cause disease.” 
21 “Management of Noncommunicable Diseases,” World Health Organization (World Health Organization), 
accessed December 2019. 
22 “Package of Essential Noncommunicable (PEN) Disease Interventions for Primary Health Care in Low-Resource 
Settings,” World Health Organization (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010), 10, 16-17, 25. 
  
infected individuals and providing them with appropriate treatment. Without adequate control, 
“infectious disease during an emergency condition can raise the death rate 60 times in 
comparison to other cases including trauma.”23 Outbreaks occur when ideal situations and 
environments for spread arise. The current COVID-19 pandemic is a tragically ideal example of 
this. As technology advances and travel is made easier, people are moving around more and 
more, farther and faster than they used to, creating many more nexuses of contact.24 Despite 
efforts of social distancing and stay-at-home orders, New York City is currently experiencing the 
worst outbreak in the US. As Dr. Steven Goodman, an epidemiologist at Stanford University, 
said “Density is really an enemy in a situation like this. With large population centers, where 
people are interacting with more people all the time, that’s where [the disease is] going to spread 
the fastest.”25  
In emergency situations, health workers are trained to rapidly identify and assess the 
cause of trauma in the community and create a plan to reduce morbidity and mortality. These 
plans consist of three main steps: identifying present infections and providing treatment, 
identifying and treating high risk individuals, and changing the environment to prevent further 
spread or reoccurrence.26 The rapid assessment consists of learning as much as possible about the 
disease as well as the community it is affecting. Non-domestic health workers should be familiar 
with various community characteristics such as the landscape, morbidity, mortality, demography, 
food and water access points, sanitation, and community leadership.27 The second step, 
identifying and treating high-risk individuals, limits interactions of the high-risk infected 
 
23 Jonathan Ameli, “Communicable Diseases and Outbreak Control,” Turkish Journal of Emergency Medicine 
(Elsevier, March 9, 2016), 20. 
24 Richard Florida, “The Geography of Coronavirus,” CityLab, April 3, 2020. 
25 Brian M. Rosenthal, “Density Is New York City’s Big ‘Enemy’ in the Coronavirus Fight,” The New York Times, 
March 23, 2020.  
26 Ameli, “Communicable Diseases and Outbreak Control,” 21. 
27 Ameli, “Communicable Disease and Outbreak Control.” 
  
individuals with the rest of the community until treated, reducing potential indices of 
transmission.28 Lastly, changing the environment that was conducive to the spread of the disease 
is necessary to prevent any recurrence and to “flatten the curve.”29 This can be done through 
vaccination, improved access to clean water, access to medical care, implementation of 
accessible healthcare systems, and more.30 Rapid, community-appropriate response is necessary 
to reduce the likelihood of disease spread and prepares communities with the proper resources 
and protocols needed on the chance another breakout occurs. 
Behavioral and Emotional Infection 
While there has been extensive research on biological infectious diseases, there is an 
emerging field of social-scientific and public health research on social and emotional infection. 
Behavioral analyses and empirical research have confirmed that human behavior tends to form 
clusters in both space and time “even in the absence of coercion and rationale,” similar to 
biological disease.31 
Emotional states can be transferred to others via emotional infection: the tendency for 
people to experience the same emotions as those in their surroundings without consciously acting 
to do so.32 People also tend to experience emotional infection without indices of direct 
interaction. This phenomenon can occur in the absence of verbal cues and manifest from 
nonverbal cues such as body language, social media, video games, and more.33 Studies have 
 
28 “Chapter 10: Controlling the spread of infectious diseases,” Advancing the right to health: the vital role of law, 
(World Health Organization, 2016), 160.  
29 Brandon Specktor, “Coronavirus: What is ‘flattening the curve,’ and will it work?” Live Science, March 16, 2020. 
30 “Chapter 10: Controlling the spread of infectious diseases,” 152. 
31 Paul Marsden, “Memetics & Social Contagion: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” Journal of Memetics: Evolutionary 
Models of Information Transmission 2 (1998). 
32 Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffery T. Hancock, “Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale 
Emotional Contagion through Social Networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 111, no. 24 (June 2, 2014), 8788. 
33 Ibid., 8788. 
  
shown that emotional infections tend to exist as “relatively automatic, unintentional, 
uncontrollable, and largely inaccessible to conversant awareness” as byproducts of reactions to 
multi-level phenomena.34 Emotions are generated through different combinations of neural 
systems, creating emotionally relevant responses according to the stimulus and response. The 
amygdala detects, encodes, and triggers responses to stimuli, particularly potential threats. Other 
activated areas of the brain include the ventral striatum, which acts to learn the reward value of a 
stimulus, and the insula, which supports awareness of the body in context of emotional 
reaction.35 These multi-level phenomena are experienced by encountering stimuli from one 
individual which is then acted or reacted upon by others, and others, and others, and so on. The 
mimicry of emotion is subconscious, consisting of mirroring facial expressions, vocal 
expressions, postures, movements, and actions. This is consistent with groups forming after 
experiencing similar actions and interactions, following the trend of groups to then assume 
attentional, emotional, and behavioral synchrony.36 
Behavior has been defined essentially as observable activity, which includes verbal 
expressions.37 Similar to emotional states being transferable via emotional infection, behavior 
too spreads like infectious biological disease. Studies have shown that people learn violent 
behaviors like any other social behavior or emotion, through experience or observation and 
 
34 Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson, “Introduction and Overview,” in Emotional 
Contagion: Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5. 
35 Laura Martin Braunstein and James J. Gross, “Explicit and Implicit Emotion Regulation: a Multi-Level 
Framework,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 12, no. 10 (September 15, 2017), 1549. 
36 Hatfield et al., Emotional Contagion, 5. 
37 Raymond M. Bergner, “What Is Behavior? And so What?” New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011), 147.  
  
eventual imitation.38 Behavioral shifts are reflected in differing neural activity, experienced when 
an individual’s decision-making processes are changed after observing another’s behavior.39  
Familiar phenomena of infectious behavior include yawning or itching. Yawning and 
itching are mirroring behaviors; when one observes someone else engaging in those actions, they 
proceed to subconsciously mirror them.40 On the more extreme end of examples is mass 
psychogenic illness (MPI), when someone gets sick because they observe someone else getting 
or acting sick.41 Shirley Wang, with the Association for Psychological Science, recounted an 
incident in 1998, when a teacher at a Tennessee high school noticed a gas-like smell in her 
classroom, and soon after felt symptoms of dizziness and nausea.42 She was brought to the 
nearby hospital, and by the end of that day, 100 more people had showed up to the emergency 
room with the same symptoms, as they believed they had been exposed to gas at the school. No 
physical illness could be detected by the hospital, and tests at the school later demonstrated that 
there was no toxic source. What happened at this high school is a clear example of MPI, “in 
which symptoms are passed from person to person among people who are visible to one 
another.”43 Though an extreme, MPI is an example of behavioral infection, where observation of 
another’s behavior subconsciously influences one’s own. Wang goes on to explain that human 
brains have certain types of neurons that fire simply from watching someone else carry out an 
action (she gives the example of watching a football game – when you see the quarterback 
 
38 Robert M. Bond and Brad J. Bushman, “The Contagious Spread of Violence Among US Adolescents Through 
Social Networks,” American Journal of Public Health 107, no. 2 (February 2017), 288. 
39 Shinsuke Suzuki et al., “Behavioral Contagion during Learning about Another Agent’s Risk-Preferences Acts on 
the Neural Representation of Decision-Risk,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America 113, no. 14 (April 5, 2016), 3755.  
40 RR Provine, “Contagious Behavior: an Alternative Approach to Mirror-like Phenomena,” Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 37, no. 2 (April 2014), 216. 
41 Shirley Wang, “Contagious Behavior,” Association for Psychological Science - APS, February 2006. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
  
throw, your arm experiences vicarious electrical signals), which primes us to understand and 
identify with other people and their actions. The ability for humans to mimic and mirror behavior 
is a subconscious manifestation of behavioral contagion.44 
Violence as an Infectious Disease 
From this point forward, I am analyzing violence as an infectious behavior. Violence, the 
infection of violence, and the treatment of violence all mimic the parallel instances of biological 
infection. Like an infection, violence spreads when left untreated.45 Whether exposure is direct 
(experiencing a violent act) or indirect (watching a movie, playing a video game, or witnessing 
people fight), the more exposure one has increases the likelihood of one contracting the 
disease.46 Infection manifests from the observation or participation in violent acts; disease 
presents as violent actions or inclinations. After one is infected, the immune system tries to 
prevent the infection from taking permanent hold in the body. Intervention and interruption of 
the infection is needed at this stage, similar to administering antibiotics to someone experiencing 
symptoms of a disease. By identifying high-risk transmitters, (i.e., those who have already been 
infected and have yet to receive treatment) and offering them resources for treatment and 
support, spread can be curbed. If left untreated, those who are infected spread the violent 
behavior by outwardly enacting violence, whether that manifestation is instant or delayed. 
Subsequently, this violence is experienced by others, whether firsthand or through a network of 
interactions, and continues to spread. Additionally, by addressing the context and environment of 
why the violence occurred, identifying what led to the act of violence and changing or alleviating 
the reason will help prevent spread. Evidence presented in Contagion of Violence, a summary of 
 
44 Ibid. 
45 Jeffrey A. Butts, Lindsay Bostwick, and Jeremy R. Porter, “Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun 
Violence,” Annual Review of Public Health 36 (March 2015), 39. 
46 Bond et al., “The Contagious Spread of Violence,” 291. 
  
a workshop on violence prevention, supports that interventions “are key to interrupting the 
contagion of violence.” 47 In the workshop, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan,48 a professor of epidemiology with 
a focus on violence prevention, suggested “retooling the relationships between the police and 
gun offenders could help interrupt community-level violence. Unregulated punishment can 
exacerbate susceptibility to violence and increase the network density of people who share police 
victimization experiences.”49 By concentrating on the factors that lead to and perpetuate the 
cycle of violence, areas for intervention can arise to facilitate the disruption of the cycle. 
Following the trend of infectious diseases, likelihood of spread decreases the farther 
away one is in the network from the original infected person. Any exposure to violence 
“increase[s] a person’s risk of adopting violent behavior themselves, meaning that violent 
behavior transmits and spreads based on exposure – just like an epidemic disease.”50 Embodying 
characteristics of epidemics, violence too clusters and spreads when left unaddressed. Violence 
itself exemplifies the inherent aspects of disease, as I defined earlier in tandem with the WHO’s 
1946 definition, as it leads to the absence of healthfulness. It plagues individuals and 
communities by eliminating the possibility of experiencing complete physical, mental, and social 
well-being. Personal contact with the disease will infect, and will continue to infect and possibly 
mature into disease, until interrupted. Researchers at Ohio State University, Bond and Bushman, 
write, “People exposed to a contagious disease are at increased risk of contracting the disease 
themselves. Numerous studies have shown that people who are exposed to violence – as 
observers or victims – are more likely to become perpetrators of violence themselves.”51 Spread 
 
47 National Research Council, Contagion of Violence: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press, 2013), 14. 
48 “Jeffrey Fagan,” Columbia Mailman School of Public Health, accessed April 2020. 
49 Contagion of Violence, 14. 
50 “The Big Idea,” Cure Violence (Cure Violence Global, 2019). 
51 Bond et al., “The Contagious Spread of Violence,” 288. 
  
can be fast or slow, as incubation periods vary. However, once the incubation period has passed, 
cases of disease (violence) aggregate, grouping closely both geographically and temporally.52 
Like biological disease, violence can be predicted. By looking at underlying social 
networks, high-risk individuals, past outbreaks, and factors leading to violence, one can predict 
where it will happen, how it will happen, and who will perpetrate the action – all from historical 
analysis of incidences.53 Predicting patterns of violence acts upon the same mechanisms of 
predicting the flu:  
“the greatest predictor of subsequent cases of colds, flu, SARS, 
Legionnaire’s [sic] disease, and other infectious diseases is a prior case – and 
specifically exposure to a prior case – of that infection. It has been said for a long 
time that violence begets violence, but it is just as tuberculosis begets tuberculosis, 
or flu begets flu, that violence begets violence.”54  
 
Addressing and acting upon the factors increasing or decreasing the likelihood of an outbreak 
can halt the spread and open up loci for treatment and future prevention. 
Conclusion: The Benefits of Terming Violence as a Disease 
Multiple advantages are associated with defining something as a disease. Terming 
something as a disease, rather than a misbehavior or an individual flaw, attracts the attention of 
medical and public health forces. The identification of violence, and specifically law 
enforcement violence, by the American Public Health Association as a public health issue has 
directed more resources to ending police violence in the US than ever before.55 Medicine and 
medical care are viewed in the US as limited resources, and those in control of those resources 
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ideally want to apply those resources to the most time-sensitive, virulent, and widespread 
diseases. Applying the labels of “an infectious disease” and “a public health issue” to violence 
directs attention and resources toward remedying the crisis. When it comes to health, people do 
not want to fall ill, people do not want to die. When disease strikes, whether infectious or an 
NCD, healing the majority protects the individual. When researchers, doctors, and other health 
care workers collectivize to aid affected populations, a solution is often reached. If those who 
collectivize have funding as well as societal and governmental support, they are able to access 
more resources to help communities who have fallen ill from diseases – communities that have 
experienced great violence. By legitimizing violence as a disease and a crisis, space is created for 
more people, organizations, and resources to be enacted for the purpose of ending that crisis. 
Violence is a health crisis, it is a disease, and the public recognition of it as such will allow for 
measures to be taken to end it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2: Network Facilitation of Behavioral Spread 
Introduction: Social Networks and Homophily 
Social networks, whether hidden or in plain sight, affect rates of spread and transmission 
of infectious diseases. Evidence backs the theory that “social networks affect health through 
social interactions at the microlevel affecting behavior at the meso- and macro-levels, and 
previous research has helped us [the authors] understand the effect of social networks on a range 
of health behaviors.”56 From this assertion, utilizing existing networks and paying attention to 
their influence on behavior change can lead to the effective intervention of an infection’s spread 
and eventually, the stop or decrease of the rate of transmission. Additionally, the consideration 
and observation of gangs as social networks that perpetrate violence, and law enforcement 
agencies as gangs, has been integral to analyzing the patterns of spread of violent behaviors. 
Social networks are defined as webs of individuals connected to each other through 
interpersonal relationships. They can be as small as a four-person family to networks as large as 
entire communities or cities. Social networks often operate on the basis of risk-theory and 
actions of conformity. Essentially, when an individual observes others’ behaviors, those 
behaviors influence their later decisions, and the individual’s behavior often shifts to the initially 
observed behavior.57 Typically, health-relevant traits factor into the formation or separation of 
network ties (relationships), those namely including, but not limited to age, class, income, 
athleticism, race, level of education, political leanings, religion, and occupation.58  
Homophily is a prominent factor when networks are being formed; it refers to the 
tendency for people to form strong social ties with similar others.59 Homogeneity is greatly 
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represented in the make-up of police forces. 77.1% of police officers are white, 13.3% of police 
officers are black, and 9.6% of police officers are made up of “other races.”60 Likewise, 85.3% 
of police officers are male and 14.7% of police officers are female.61 Thus, we can see that police 
forces in the US are overwhelmingly (and disproportionately) white and male. An interactive 
article published by The New York Times exemplifies the typical “race gap” in US police 
departments, finding that the percentage of white officers on the force is on average “more than 
30 percentage points higher than in the communities they serve” (See Appendix, Figure 1).62  
When people in networks share similarities, they tend to have more contact with each 
other and more in common to create a strong foundation for the network.63 Due to the degree of 
closeness shared in many ties within a network, the spread of contagious factors is easily 
facilitated. The spread of these factors is also closely tied to the structure of the network, 
particularly in relation to the network’s topological properties.64 These include the tendencies for 
there to be a leader, or multiple leaders, in a network, and many individuals (nodes) which 
follow the norms and actions presented by the leader(s). Geodetic properties similarly factor into 
the ease of dissemination of contagion, particularly the degrees of separation between the 
initiator of an action and an individual, diameters of networks, and the centrality and clustering 
of social networks, all of which are encompassed in studies of contagion within community 
social networks.65 
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Network Facilitation of Infection 
Infection and infectious factors adapt according to the structure of networks in order to 
spread effectively. Infection is limited to certain degrees of separation between the source and 
other nodes, and the strength of the influence of contagion decays with increasing time and 
distance.66 Studies have shown that high-degree nodes, i.e. leaders or highly respected 
individuals within a network, are disproportionately the source of introducing novel behaviors to 
a network.67 These actors, who have many ties, exist in a position of centrality, and can reach a 
larger number of individuals over the course of a short distance. Consequently, these actors are 
extremely prominent in facilitating the spread of novel, contagious behaviors.68 As emotional 
states can be directly transferred and learned through observation and imitation, following an 
infectious disease model, influential actors within a social network can considerably influence 
network-wide behavior and emotion.  
As networks have the capability to spread behavior and emotion, they can too spread the 
behavior of violent action. Social networks are made up of ties between individuals who are 
interrelated through various functions: similarities, social relations, interactions, and flows.69 
Similarities link actors in the same temporal and geographical locations, as well as linking them 
by their shared attributes. Social relations account for types of relationships, whether kinships, 
friendships, employee-boss relationships, or others. Interactions encompass the range of different 
degrees of ties, from people we talk to once, to people we interact with daily, to people who help 
us in times of need. Lastly, flows are determinant of the action by which and speed of 
information travels among ties in a network. They are dependent on the structure and proximity 
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of ties within the network, and facilitate the spread of action, information, behavior, and other 
factors.70 
Social Networks and Law Enforcement 
Patterns of behavior are subsequently formed through recurring social interactions, which 
are the foundation of social networks. These patterns create a social structure within the network, 
and subsequently, hierarchy, which is often predicated on fraternity.71 In police departments, 
participation in the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is quite common; the organization boasts 
having over 300,000 members nation-wide (nearly 50% of the nation’s law enforcement agents). 
The FOP is the largest nation-wide police association and is made up almost solely of white 
leaders for local chapters (even in communities predominantly of color), and a 70% white 
membership base. Infamous for its racist beliefs and public presence, the FOP exemplifies the 
power of homophily influencing social structures within a network, in this case, police 
departments nation-wide.72 The overwhelming presence of and oversight by white officers in 
police departments subsequently places undue pressure on officers of color to perform arrests 
and perpetrate harm, often as directives of higher-ups to discredit the belief that policing is a 
racist institution.73 
Social structure influences the flow of information within social networks, and 
subsequently, the behaviors and emotions of individuals within the networks. The two core 
features of social networks consist of the sort of social ties among nodes and the patterns these 
ties create across nodes, as described in the preceding paragraph. These features account for 
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individuals’ quality of life, physical and mental health, mortality, risk of disease acquisition and 
transmission, tendency toward “criminal behavior,” and more.74 The tightly-knit nature of 
relationships within law enforcement agencies shares attributes with close social networks. 
Individuals within departments function closely and intimately day-to-day; they share 
experiences that have the possibility to influence their physical and mental health and engage in 
various actions and behaviors together. In their study on violence and social networks, 
researchers Fleisher and McCarty detail that individuals within a close social network can share 
the tendency to engage in “criminal behavior” together.75 While criminal behavior is not a 
universally defined qualifier, it can be connected to violent behavior. That being said, law 
enforcement agents do engage in violent behavior. In a report published by the US Department 
of Justice,  
43% of police officers answered yes to “always following the rules is not 
compatible with getting the job done,” 61% “do not always report serious abuse 
by fellow officers,” 84% “witnessed fellow officers using more force than 
necessary,” and 52% of officers agreed or strongly agreed that it is not unusual for 
police officers to “turn a blind eye” to other officers’ improper misconduct.”76  
 
The behavioral ties between law enforcement agents encourages mutual protection from 
punishment and therefore less accountability for transgressive actions.77 Further supporting the 
idea of mutual protection from punishment, sociologist Mark S. Granovetter reaffirms that 
individuals’ decisions to participate in an activity is influenced by the presence or absence of 
other individuals participating in these activities.78 For example, if one law enforcement agent 
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sees another using excessive force without repercussions, this can encourage their tendency to 
use excessive force in the future.79  
Re-thinking the Term “Gang” 
 Gangs are built upon the simple concept of being a group.80 They are defined as “first and 
foremost social groups,” the standard definition being a group of three or more people who 
commit crime.81,82 As the term “criminal” is subjective and not universally defined, I have 
chosen to interact with the concept of crime as I have been previously with the term “criminal 
activity,” which is interacting with it as an entity of violent behavior. A standard gang definition 
is a group of three or more people who commit crime, or perpetrate harm, which I posit, applies 
to police officers in a common department as gang members, who undisputedly do engage in 
harmful and violent behavior.83 Although many studies depict how violence spreads as an 
infectious disease within gangs, I have been unable to find studies of a similar nature that focus 
on law enforcement agents. The lack of scholarship and analysis on law enforcement in the US 
can likely be attributed due to the privatized status of a supposed public resource – police in the 
US are notoriously untouchable, thus, critiquing their actions is not widely done nor accepted.84 
Historically, there has been a significant gap in legal scholarship on police and police killings. 
There is, on average, less than one academic publication a year on police homicides, compared to 
about 60 publications each year on the death penalty.85 For a comparison, there are on average 
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over 1,000 police shootings each year,86 compared to an average of 42 deaths resulting from the 
death penalty per year.87 The discrepancy is stark, ascribed to the national desensitization to 
police killings, which occur with “numbing familiarity.”88 
 To further support this claim, Fleisher and McCarthy’s use Sierra-Arevalo and 
Papachristos’ description of gangs to explain their nuances: 
“Sierra-Arevalo and Papachristos (2015) wrote that “[g]angs are more than a 
collection of individuals. Gangs are a group in the true sense of the word … [these] 
operate at the supra-individual or collective level” (p.  164). They attribute gang 
group activities to cohesion among group members. Cohesion, then, enhances gang 
members’ willingness to sustain their gang membership and commit crime. Social 
processes [a]ffecting cohesion, the researchers argue, explain gang behavior, but 
they don’t specify measures of cohesion. In this conceptualization a gang group is: 
(1) a multiplex, cohesive group and, (2) upon membership, confers upon new gang 
members multiple types of relations, creating a sense of one-for-all, all-for-one.89 
 
Multiple phrases within this excerpt parallel descriptions of law enforcement agencies within the 
US: the operation at “supra-individual or collective level,” “cohesion...enhanc[ing] gang 
members’ willingness to sustain their gang membership,” and “a sense of one-for-all, all-for-
one.” These multiplex, cohesive groups made up of close ties are dependent on the factors of 
officers occupying the same space for the majority of their days, every day.90 
 Considering the way that law enforcement can function as a gang – an extremely 
codependent, behavior-sharing network – it can be determined that these networks have innate 
and strong functions to facilitate committing acts of violence.91 The facilitation of violent acts 
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through group processes is dependent on a range of mechanisms and processes that develop and 
interact through a basis of the establishment of a collective identity. By thinking and acting as a 
unit, behaviors tend to be shared and introduced to all group members over time, influencing the 
way they act in situations and the actions they perpetrate. Gangs function in communities often 
by enacting various indices of power as mechanisms of social control. They also do so to address 
threats (or perceived threats), to serve as protectors, especially through an “avenue to mete out 
justice or correct a perceived wrong.”92 These markers of “gang behavior” are consistent with 
how police function in communities, “to protect and to serve.”93 Additionally, participation in 
both “gangs” and law enforcement agencies allows for “achievement of social standing within a 
community as well as a sense of power.”94  
 Conflicts between different groups can influence subsequent acts of violence. These 
conflicts tend to result in patterns of conflict, which eventually grow into more institutionalized 
structures of oppression and violence. Regular patterns of conflict create habits which shape 
gang’s (police departments) subsequent violent behavior. This in turn creates and perpetuates 
hierarchies of supremacy, where aggressive gangs (in this case, police) gain higher status in 
society, and victimized gangs (in this case, marginalized groups, those who have experienced 
police-initiated violence) obtain a lower status in society. 
The Power of Networks 
To further emphasize the vitalness of the consideration of social networks as integral to 
discussing and mitigating violence, it is important to acknowledge the inherent link between 
social networks and health. Simply put, people are connected, and therefore their health is 
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interconnected.95 Social network analyses have been used to study various human-based 
phenomena, including but not limited to aging, mortality, interpersonal violence, gangs, 
community social support networks, and crime and criminal intelligence.96 Looking at specific 
facets of networks that facilitate cyclical violence is essential when attempting to understand 
how networks have the potential to negatively affects health. By studying networks and mapping 
relationships, commonalities, and experiences, violence-related indices can be identified. Focal-
point individuals – those who have many ties throughout a network – can also be identified as 
being a potential high-risk nexus of behavioral spread. Additionally, tracing the spread of violent 
actions through social networks is invaluable information for public health and medical 
professionals to focus on working on rerouting and halting pathways of transmission.97 
Tapping into networks can interrupt the spread of violent behavior. Studies have 
evidenced that analysis and action with social networks create space for there to be interventions 
and subsequent change of network behavior to non-violent actions over short periods of time.98 
Therefore, harnessing and using such networks could help promote and maintain behavioral 
change. This may involve changing the structure or functioning of existing networks or the 
purposeful development of new social networks or ties. Furthermore, analyses of interventions 
that take explicit account of previously unobserved social networks may better uncover 
mediators and pathways of initiation and maintenance of behavior change.99 
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Chapter 3: The Components of US Law Enforcement and the Prison-Industrial Complex 
Introduction  
Currently, the US has two main measures in place to react to and control violence: law 
enforcement (also referred to as policing, or police) and correctional facilities (also referred to as 
the prison-industrial complex, or PIC). The police’s main purposes include maintaining 
community safety, namely through acts of order maintenance, service, and law enforcement.100 
Order maintenance often focuses on preventing and/or stopping behaviors that could disturb 
others, colloquially known as “keeping the peace.” Keeping the peace can cover a range of 
actions, some examples being preventing a fight from breaking out, helping neighbors negotiate 
over a barking dog, or preventing littering. Regarding acts of service, the police engage in 
services such as first aid, roadside car assistance, finding lost property or pets, and wellness 
checks. Lastly, under the category of law enforcement, police identify when the law has been 
violated, and subsequently identify, apprehend, and detain the perpetrator of the violated law 
(which is where correctional facilities become relevant). The police operate to maintain 
community safety and are supposed to do so through as harmless measures as possible.101 
Law Enforcement 
In the US, policing is conducted by “close to 18,000 federal, state, local and city 
departments, all with their own rules.”102 Combining all of these departments, as of 2018, there 
were 686,655 law enforcement agents in the country.103 All departments have different operating 
protocols, follow different regional laws, and engage in different training programs. “There is no 
universal standard for the structure, size, or governance of police departments in the United 
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States.”104 The most widespread practice of police officers is to perform their roles in a way that 
protects everyone’s constitutional rights.  
Correctional Facilities 
Correctional facilities operate to interact with and detain individuals who have been 
convicted of violating the law. Individuals awaiting trial are often detained and must stay in jails 
operated by local governments. Additionally, when individuals are sentenced to a short period of 
incarceration, they stay in jails. When individuals are incarcerated for longer periods of time, or 
for life, they are held in prisons, which are either privatized or operated on a state or federal 
level. To simplify, prisons can be described as buildings or systems that house people who have 
violated the law, as punishment. The punishment operates via the deprivation of civil liberties, 
such as autonomy, material comforts, and personal security.105 
Theories of Punishment and Carcerality 
The phrase “correctional facility” is an umbrella term representing jails, prisons, or other 
places of incarceration by government officials.106 Correctional facilities were developed on 
theories of punishment of criminality, as well as rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. 
The rehabilitative aspect focuses on changing individuals' lives in a way that will make them 
“productive members of society” upon release. In well-funded facilities, vocational and 
educational programs are offered, as well as substance use disorder management and emotion-
focused counseling.107 Measures of rehabilitation are concerned with the nature of the 
incarcerated individual, as well as their well-being.  
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Deterrence theory is the foundation for many penal policies and practices. It follows the 
belief that people make decisions based on what will give them pleasure or pain, and unless 
deterred, they will pursue their own desires, even if that desire is “committing crimes.”108 
General deterrence theory acts upon the belief that if people see others suffering from harsh 
punishments, they will fear the same consequences and will not engage in the same activities that 
provoked those harsh punishments (for example, an exaggerated news coverage of a trial and 
eventual life sentence for that individual). Conversely, individual deterrence acts upon oneself, 
where one will experience punishment for an action and will avoid that action to avoid 
experiencing punishment again (for example, receiving a speeding ticket).109 The formation of 
policies and practices of penality on the basis of deterrence predicates that individuals will be 
educated on their actions and consequences of said actions. This practice relays a message to the 
individual that what they did was wrong, which the individual perceives as a threat that informs 
the direction of their future actions.110 Deterrence functions through threatening people with 
punishments in response to their actions, most often manifested in the omnipresence of police, 
enhancing the perception that police are there to constantly surveil, subsequently increasing the 
likelihood of someone being “caught” for committing a “crime.”111  
 Lastly, the carceral theory of incapacitation acts with the goal of preventing “dangerous 
and prolific offenders” from reoffending in the community.112 It is predicated on the idea that 
while imprisoned and removed from society, people cannot commit crimes. As individuals often 
redirect patterns of power and abuse to the people directly surrounding them while incarcerated, 
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incapacitation acts as a medium for further perpetuation of the cycle of violence. Incapacitation 
essentially works to prevent future, hypothetical acts of harm, often without a basis of evidence 
that another act of harm may be committed.113 The most extreme form of incapacitation is capital 
punishment, acting on the pretense of eliminating the possibility for any more crimes or acts of 
harm being committed by an individual.114 By executing someone, the state acts to protect the 
naïve society from hypothetical future (often unfounded) dangerousness committed by the 
individual.115 Incapacitation for any length of time has demonstrated to be ineffective at 
preventing later offenses, as the longer one is kept in a correctional facility, the more likely that 
their supportive community bonds will fracture, leaving them with little to no support system 
upon re-entry to society.116 In his study “Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing 
Policy,” Andrew D. Leipold argues that sentences that act to incapacitate “buy increments of 
crime delay… eventually translat[ing] into fewer overall crimes.”117 Leipold summarizes that 
despite this intention, “up to half of all state and federal inmates are reconvicted of a crime after 
their release”118 though this recidivism rate varies greatly when considering type of crime and 
demographics of the “re-offender,” such as age and gender.119 A nine-year long Bureau of Justice 
Statistics study (2005-2014) of state “prisoner” recidivism rates, looking at the recidivism rates 
of the 401,288 people who had been released in 2005, found that over the nine-year period, there 
were an average of five arrests per “released prisoner.” “An estimated 68% of released prisoners 
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were arrested within 3 years, 79% within 6 years, and 83% during years 4 through 9.”120 Looking 
at that data, I believe that incapacitation is an inadequate basis of punishment, especially 
considering its supposed partnering with rehabilitation. Incapacitation is a largely unbacked, 
unproven theory that is used to justify the unjust length of sentences of the 2.3 million people 
who are currently confined nation-wide.121 
Police Abuse of Power 
Contrary to the duties outlined in various police departments across the country, 
including the overarching goal to maintain everyone’s constitutional rights, there has historically 
been a profusion of incidences of police abuse of power exercised over non-police.  Police abuse 
and violence occur at great rates, but the majority of harm and misconduct go unreported. This 
under-reporting is likely due to fears of not being taken seriously, fears of retaliation, and beliefs 
that police will not be held accountable. There are three major government databases monitoring 
police killings and abuse: the National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, which documents all deaths in the US (and has a category for “legal 
interventions” within NVSS – National Vital Statistics System), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) Supplemental Homicide Reporting System, which monitors police-reported 
“justifiable homicides,” and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) program accruing data on 
arrest-related deaths (ARDs), which has included homicides by police in its system since 
2003.122 Despite what seems like a comprehensive set of systems for accountability and data of 
police homicides and abuse, it is important to note that reporting began in the early 2000s, and 
today, these systems receive their data through voluntary reports provided by police departments 
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and other law enforcement agencies.123 Additionally, there is no system in place to audit this 
data, if agencies choose to report.124 Subsequently, the combinations of the three above 
government databases have consistently under-reported incidences of police homicides, usually 
reporting at a rate of 50% of the actual number.125 The more comprehensive data is compiled 
through various grassroots, independent reporting systems, with data coming from the 
government reports as well as through word of mouth and the media.126 As of the end of 2019, 
there are no conclusive, agreed upon data points regarding the number of police homicides that 
occurred this year. There are no government publications yet analyzing data from 2019, but the 
FBI reports 410 “justifiable homicides” in 2018.127 In 2018, grassroots sources reported an 
estimated 992 people who were shot and killed by police – nearly 600 more reports than 
government sources.128,129 
Though the above data is specific to police homicides, it shines a light on the fact that 
other incidences of police violence, whether physical, mental or emotional, go largely 
unreported. Police brutality is a national crisis, and it needs to be addressed at a much higher 
caliber. The considerably broad presence of officers in communities creates a culture of fear 
through surveillance. This fear is maintained through officers’ authorization to use force to stop 
incidents before they have even occurred. A prolific and publicized example of this tactic is stop-
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and-frisk,130 predicated on profiling individuals and monitoring social interactions, leading to 
discrimination-based (particularly by race and class) violent encounters initiated by police. 
Police also frequently perpetrate sexual violence through non-consensually searching the genital 
areas of individuals they have detained.131  Experiencing these types of police violence has been 
linked to increased risk of physical and mental illness, especially an elevated risk of suicidal 
attempts and ideations (Figure 2).132  
 
Figure 2. Graphs (a) and (b) demonstrate the heightened risk of attempting and thinking about attempting suicide 
after police victimization, sorted by type of police victimization. 
 
The effects of police violence are experienced disproportionately by communities of color, and 
other marginalized groups determined by various factors including but not limited to race, sex, 
gender, religion, substance dependency, disability, and class.133 
Exposure to Violence During Incarceration 
Data and information on correctional facilities have exhibited patterns of disproportionate 
rates of victimization of prisoners (such as through assault, robbery, rape, or extortion) compared 
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to that of the general population. These reports act against the goals that correctional facilities 
reportedly work towards, specifically rehabilitation. Correctional facilities often expose people to 
more violence than they may have previously experienced on “the outside” and thus contributes 
to the spread of violence. Incarcerated people often experience severe isolation, to the degree of 
their social skills degenerating.134 The degree of anger and brutalization encountered during 
periods of institutionalization is immense, and the effects are far-reaching.135 Demetrius Buckley, 
incarcerated at St. Louis Correctional Facility (St. Louis, MI) wrote “Death is too common in 
prison to feel anything for someone who would take your life too if they had to.”136 This lived 
experience is reflected in the mortality rate of people incarcerated in state prisons. The mortality 
rate in state prisons in 2016 was reportedly 303 deaths per 100,000 people.137 This staggering 
number cannot be attributed to trends of suicidality or lethal assault consistent with the US 
population, as those average rates are 15.3138 and 5.0,139 respectively.  
Extreme surveillance and instances of deprivation are also reported through various 
personal testimonies. Jerry Metcalf, incarcerated at Thumb Correctional Facility (Lapeer, MI), 
stated that “The shower is the one place I’m guaranteed to find solitude, if only for ten minutes at 
a time.”140 Peter Inserra, formerly incarcerated at Collins Correctional Facility (Collins, NY) 
reported that he “[l]ost 25 lbs in 4 months eating prison food.”141 Individuals are deprived of 
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various rights beyond their suspension of civil rights, deprivation experienced through lack of 
food, lack of privacy, inability to exercise, lack of access to medical care, and isolation. Despite 
the extreme surveillance, nearly 68% of those in jails, and over 50% of those in state prisons, 
have diagnosable substance use disorders, compared to the 9% rate of the general population.142 
14.5% of males and 31% of females in prison suffer from serious mental health illnesses, and 
most receive little to no treatment in custody.143,144 These rates of serious mental health illnesses 
are much greater than the average rates in the general population, 3.2% for males, and 4.9% for 
females.145 Furthermore, an estimated 72% of people in jail have co-occurring serious mental 
health illnesses and substance use disorders.146  
To analogize why incarcerating people contributes to the cyclic nature of violence, I will 
use an example of a generic pandemic, transmitted through air. For example, if someone with a 
compromised immune system (someone with a history of interacting with violence) is placed in a 
room with people with the disease (a room of people who are presently violent/who are being 
deprived of their needs in a correctional facility), the person with the compromised immune 
system will likely contract the disease (the person with a history of interacting with violence will 
likely become violent or embody violent tendencies and characteristics). Providing someone with 
a compromised immune system with support measures, such as food, shelter, and water, will 
likely increase their baseline immune strength and stability, lessening their likelihood of 
contracting the disease than if left in a room with people with the disease. Similarly, if someone 
who has previously acted violently or interacted with violence is provided with support and 
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resources, rather than placed involuntarily in a facility with other potentially violent people, their 
likelihood of recidivism will decrease.147 
Policing and Incarceration as an Initial Infection Vector 
Through analyzing the actions of police and prisons in the US, the model of violence as 
an infectious disease can be applied to police and carceral violence, with prisons and police 
functioning as principal propelling agents. The systems of policing and restriction in the US were 
flawed from their origin, predicated on inequality, white supremacy, and patriarchal ideals. 
Policing and theories of carcerality can and do act as initial infection vectors for some 
individuals within the larger system by perpetuating cyclical violence. Similarly, the unequal 
holding on society by police and incarceration further drives the cycle of violence. I include 
details on the PIC and carceral theory to exemplify the continued violence that one is subjected 
to after interacting with law enforcement. The theories of carcerality outlined in this chapter are 
foundational to understanding how policing operates and is justified in the US. Police have 
historically acted to maintain and protect the power of people who systematically act to hurt and 
intimidate others, and to maintain the power of capitalism, predicated on exploitation, creating 
and perpetuating a culture of violence in the US.148 These incidences of protecting power 
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intimately ties policing in the US to the political-economy, rather than any purported incidences 
of crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Police acted as a force of social control of the classes perceived as “dangerous” and “inferior.” Commonly, police 
acted to protect white, wealthy factory owners against so-called “rioting” by their workers, which were typically 
union strikes for better working conditions against employers, an example of police protecting those in societal 
power. Similarly, police acted as a force to keep “peace” during the Civil Rights Movement, which challenged 
“white hegemony in the South and racist social policies in the North,” where they “kept peace” through exerting 
brutal force upon Civil Rights activists. In the late 1960s, police also worked to shut down anti-war demonstrations 
– anything that opposed the government and people in power.  
Source: Gary Potter, “The History of Policing in the United States,” Eastern Kentucky University School of Justice 
Studies, 2001. 
  
Chapter 4: What can be done? 
Introduction 
Violence is an epidemic, and thus a public health crisis, and the lack of accountability 
surrounding the crisis of police violence is incredibly dangerous. Exposure to violence increases 
the risk of developing other illnesses and increases the risk of premature death, despite it being 
possible to effectively prevent violence using health methods.149 Like other infectious diseases, 
exposure to violence increases an individual’s probability of adopting violent behavior 
themselves, which they can subsequently spread and transmit through exposing other people to 
violence. Violence is cyclic and generates more violence, as well as fear, distrust, and panic.150 
Therefore, it is imperative to change the mindset of “violence cannot be prevented” and approach 
violence like any other infectious disease, by treating it with a public health model.  
Specifically, police violence is endemic and must be addressed. Over fifty percent of 
police-initiated homicides go unreported; there is no comparative statistic on how much police 
violence goes unreported, but one may deduce that a large percentage of acts of police violence 
go unreported due to fears of retaliation or of not being taken seriously. According to the 
database “Mapping Police Violence,” 1,099 people were killed by police in 2019. “Black people 
were 24% of those killed despite being only 13% of the population.”151 The racist pedagogy in 
which policing is situated is paramount in looking at these statistics. They’re numbers, yes, 
tragic, disappointing numbers, but more importantly they’re lives. Just like violence spreads 
through a network, grief too, spreads like an infectious disease, impacting everyone in contact 
with one of those people. Though grief is almost assuredly felt by the friends and families of the 
shooting victims, there is no accountability for the perpetrators of the violence. Of the police-
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initiated killings between 2013-2019, only 1% of incidents resulted in officers being charged 
with a crime.152  
A public health model must be used and adapted to cure and alleviate the harms of the 
disease: violence. Traditional three-step public health models for approaching infectious diseases 
are: detecting and interrupting areas of spread, identifying and treating high risk individuals, and 
changing social norms.153 Public health models have proven to be successful in reducing rates of 
violence in communities around the world, and I argue that the model can be expanded and 
adapted to address police-initiated violence as well. 
The Origin of Cure Violence 
Cure Violence was founded by Gary Slutkin, MD, a former head of the WHO 
Intervention Development Unit and Professor of Epidemiology and International Health at the 
University of Illinois School of Public Health. The goal of the organization is: “To reduce 
violence globally using disease control and behavior change methods.”154 CeaseFire Chicago 
was the initial program launched using Slutkin’s methodology (CeaseFire was the original name 
of the organization, now known as Cure Violence).  
Cure Violence Methodology 
The organization Cure Violence is dedicated to stopping violence using a public health 
model, and they have adapted the three steps to fit the goal of ceasing violent actions. Cure 
Violence originated as an organization working to stop intra- and inter-gang gun violence and is 
currently working on an application of their model to stop police violence. Therefore, the steps 
presented may seem a bit unsuited for police violence, which I will address in a later section of 
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this chapter. Step one is detecting and interrupting conflicts, as conflicts can function as a 
medium for spreading. To do this, Cure Violence works with three sub-steps, preventing 
retaliation, mediating ongoing conflicts, and maintaining contact to make sure new conflicts do 
not arise. To prevent retaliation, Cure Violence outreach workers speak to those involved in the 
conflict immediately after any dispute as well as their friends and family to equalize the situation 
and provide support. Additionally, to mediate any ongoing conflicts, they discuss open-ended 
disputes with all people involved such as recent arrests and prison releases, aiming to quell 
anxieties and anger potentially surrounding those events. Lastly, they maintain this contact with 
all people involved in the conflict for as long as necessary to keep communication and support 
channels open to prevent conflicts from recurring.155 
The second step focuses on identifying and treating those at high-risk of contracting 
violent behaviors and subsequently spreading violence. Cure Violence workers do this by 
gaining the trust of those at risk, discovering their needs, and providing appropriate treatment. 
They help individuals gain access to support they may need, whether it be social services, 
counseling, employment, substance misuse treatment, or leaving gangs. Additionally, they 
provide education on how to change behaviors by responding to highly charged situations in an 
alternative manner. This is done alongside discussions of the costs of violence, such as loss of 
their own lives, prison, or the emotional strain placed on their loved ones.  
Lastly, Cure Violence strives to change social norms surrounding violence. This is done 
through the efforts of community mobilization, by engaging community leaders, faith leaders, 
family members, and more, all to commit to the message that the community does not and will 
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not condone violence. To further show support of this message, the community mobilizes to 
respond to each and every shooting, showing constant condemnation of shootings and any form 
of violence.  
The Cure Violence outreach workers, also known as violence interrupters, are community 
members that have been trained to intervene in conflicts and provide support following conflicts. 
The violence interrupters, particularly in the case of CeaseFire, are often individuals that had 
been in a gang and had since left, or had been in prison, people that were self-described as those 
who had “turned [their] li[ves] around, and now wanted to help others do the same.”156 Their 
former statuses provided them with a familiarity with gang culture, as well as a foundation of 
respect in interactions with clients, as they had often been in similar life situations. The violence 
interrupters being culturally appropriate allowed for messages to be delivered in a more well-
received manner than if not. These messengers were not alienating nor threatening, and were not 
armed, making their interactions far more equalized than interactions with law enforcement. 
Additionally, that violence interrupters came from the community that they were working with 
made the community more apt to listen and learn than if the violence interrupters had been 
complete strangers to come in and “fix” a place they had never lived in. The organization's 
methodology provided structure and support while leaving room for violence interrupters to 
improvise and adapt interactions to each unique situation, leading to many successful outcomes. 
CeaseFire Chicago Background 
CeaseFire Chicago was operated by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention through 
the University of Illinois School of Public Health. It began in 1999, expanding to twenty-five 
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sites at its peak function in the mid-2000s.157 Toward the end of the 2000s, an in-depth analysis 
of the program was performed by a team of researchers from the National Institute of Justice and 
Northwestern University (hereafter referred to as the NIJ/NU analysis). They reported that by the 
end of the program, that “violence was down by one measure of another in most of the areas that 
were examined in detail.”158 There were significant shifts in gang homicide patterns, as well as 
declines in gang involvement in homicide and retaliatory killings.  
 The program’s main goal was a shift in behavior change, focusing on stopping shootings 
and killings, while not placing an emphasis on demanding that clients “go straight.”159 Outreach 
workers attempted to help clients with the current conflicts that they were facing in their lives, 
and risk management was employed with an emphasis on harm reduction, rather than personal 
redemption in response to those conflicts. The program emphasized three operational “levers” 
that could be “pulled” to halt shootings.160 These levers were focused on norms, decisions, and 
risks. Outreach workers strove to change operative norms regarding violence, both in the 
community and when working with individual clients. They worked to provide on-the-spot 
alternatives to violence when gangs and individuals were making harmful behavioral decisions. 
This follows the ideology of violence spreading like a disease, as it is copied and implemented 
into an individual’s response mechanisms as a learned response to situations that could be “dealt 
with” with violence.161 Lastly, there was an emphasis on increasing the perceived risks of 
involvement in violence, as theorized by Cure Violence above, by highlighting the likelihood of 
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incarceration, injury, death, and social risks (families losing their main source of income, putting 
family/friends in danger, and the emotional impact of losing a loved one.) 
CeaseFire Chicago Case Study Analysis 
Research indicates that mobilization efforts that encourage active, vigorous intervention 
of violence in the defense of community norms tend to directly lead to a reduction of violence.162 
Thus, community mobilization as a response to shootings and killings and a clear message from 
the community on its stance regarding violence are integral to violence prevention efforts. 
CeaseFire manifested the re-working of community norms through engaging with residents, local 
businesses, clergy members, community groups, and elected officials within the community to 
create a unified response to violence. To show consistent support, there were marches, rallies, 
and prayer vigils following every shot fired, carrying the message “stop the shooting.”163 
Information was spread about the resources and interventions available through CeaseFire, 
reverberating the community’s intolerance for violence. Outreach workers also expressed the 
feelings of pain experienced by victims and their families as a result of the tragedy, to emphasize 
the emotional aspect of consequences of violence. 
It is important to note that in this program, law enforcement input was viewed more as a 
last effort. Police were mostly requested to enforce responses to shootings and work toward 
stricter gun control and as a last resort, to purport the prospects of legal repercussions and 
incarceration.164  
CeaseFire systematically collected data to monitor activity throughout the duration of 
their programs. They looked at various indicators, such as the number of shooting responses, 
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community events, attendance to these events, distribution of educational materials, home visits 
done by outreach workers, and the number of conflicts mediated. These data points were looked 
at alongside police crime trend data from local departments, on homicides, shootings, and 
assaults in CeaseFire zones and comparison zones. The analysis of this data reported the “major 
message… that there has been a reduction of aggravated assaults and batteries with a firearm, 
shootings, and killings in the CeaseFire zones.”165 
The data collected by the Chicago police department was also used to identify and 
eventually select sites for CeaseFire intervention. Site selection was determined by a number of 
measures, particularly the level of violence in the area, the community’s capacity to administer 
CeaseFire activities, the level of political support (and subsequent funding access), and whether 
they could be responsible for outreach, coalition building, and public education activities within 
the community.166 
The sites analyzed in the CeaseFire Chicago initiative beginning in 2000 had multiple 
sites. In one area of the city, ten out of eleven sites were made up of more than 80% African-
American residents.167 In another area, there was a collection of six predominantly Latinx 
sites.168 In the last sector, there were five sites qualified as “diverse” in racial makeup.169 The 
unifying factors between all of the sites included a majority of residents living under the poverty 
line, as well as similar statistics on gun murders and shootings (aggravated assault and battery) 
per 10,000 residents.170  
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The NIJ/NU analysis went over a few common issues presented in site and host selection. 
Some high-need areas were unable to establish CeaseFire program sites because there were no 
local host agencies able to act as a base for a CeaseFire office.171 Additionally, because the 
program was run on grants, funding was a large deciding factor. Some sites had strong 
community-based organizations and active political representatives that were better equipped to 
gain CeaseFire’s attention while also being able to provide more substantive funding. Sites that 
had faith-based hosts were occasionally unsuccessful, because there was (though not in every 
scenario) pressure for religion and church-membership pushed onto clients, which, in some 
cases, turned clients away from CeaseFire services altogether.172 Lastly, there was not enough 
training provided for all outreach workers. Training was most often generalized and did not fully 
prepare outreach workers for every situation they could encounter while working with clients 
and their communities.173  
CeaseFire Data Analysis 
Data on the trends of violence in CeaseFire sites were collected over the course of 210 
months, ending in June 2008.174 These months covered the span of time from before the 
program’s implementation, to the post-implementation program duration, and the months “post-
program.” The “post-program” period of time occurred during a brief funding hiatus and allowed 
for data to be collected when the program was temporarily suspended in some sites.175 The 
average post-implementation length for sites was 68 months, though the range was between 40 to 
97 months.176 Each CeaseFire site had three or four comparison sites bordering the CeaseFire 
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area. These comparison sites best matched the CeaseFire site’s demographic features and rates of 
gun use, and did not have CeaseFire programming.177 Seven sites in total were analyzed for the 
majority of the report as the data on those seven sites spanned pre-implementation, post-
implementation, and post-program, as other programs were not affected by the funding hiatus in 
2008, and therefore did not have any post-program data. 
 In the analysis, killing was defined as a homicide involving a firearm. At the time of this 
study’s publication, 72% of homicides in Chicago involved a firearm.178 Another data point 
measured was “shots fired” incidents, which were identified by the Chicago police as aggravated 
assaults and aggravated batteries. In the shots fired analysis, data reflected that shootings in the 
Southwest site declined significantly after the introduction of the program, even relative to a 
decline noticed in the area before that point.179 In four total sites, changes in shots fired were 
statistically significant after the introduction of CeaseFire, trends that were described as “instant 
and persistent.” A fifth site experienced statistically significant changes described as “gradual 
and persistent.” All of these sites experienced declines in shots fired ranging between 14 and 22 
percent (See Appendix, Table 1).180  I found that these numbers reflected CeaseFire’s goal – 
though not a total resolution, there was a decrease in shootings, thus a lessening of violent action, 
as a result of the program being introduced.  
In an analysis of CeaseFire’s impact on persons shot, five out of seven sites experienced a 
statistically significant decline in persons shot, with the decline ranging from 18 to 28 percent. 
Out of these five, three declines were declared as attributed to CeaseFire, while the other two 
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were “probably not,” as there were similar declines in their comparison areas (See Appendix, 
Table 2).181 
The analysis also looked into the effects of CeaseFire on geographical patterns of 
shootings in the same seven sites. These geographical renditions were analyses of “hot spots,” or 
certain areas with a high density of shooting patterns. In four of the sites, there were decreases in 
the size and intensity of shootings linked to CeaseFire’s introduction to the area.182 Other hot 
spots also experienced decreases in size, but it was indeterminate whether that was due to the 
program or not. I think the lack of certainty can be attributed to the variance in data collection 
and in site characteristics. It was important to analyze and map the hot spots as they 
demonstrated whether or not the concentration of shooting rates actually decreased, or if 
shootings relocated to other areas. One site, Auburn-Gresham exemplified CeaseFire’s effects on 
the geographical shooting patterns. The hot spot shrank (though still present two years post-
implementation of CeaseFire) and the “cooler” areas expanded more quickly in CeaseFire sites 
than in comparison sites (See Appendix, Figures 3 and 4). These effects are demonstrative of 
CeaseFire’s ability to disrupt geographical patterns of shootings (See Appendix, Table 3).183  
CeaseFire: Gang Violence 
 The last part of the report focuses specifically on gang networks, performed through the 
analysis of social networks. This was done to understand which gangs were engaged in patterns 
of institutionalized conflict as well as to assess the extent of which there may have been any 
changes in the structure of gang homicides in CeaseFire sites in comparison to their matched 
comparison sites.184 Four measures were used to analyze the effects of CeaseFire on gang 
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homicide patterns: change in network density, degree of centrality, degree centralization, and 
reciprocity. Network density observations were based on the homicides reported within a 
network in proportion to all of the possible ties within the network, which effectively measured 
the overall activity of the network. The degree of centrality focused on the amount of activity of 
individual gangs within the network, while the degree centralization measure looked at how 
much of the total distribution of activity was concentrated between a small number of gangs 
within the supranetwork. Lastly, reciprocity measured the “bi-directional exchange of murders 
between gangs.”185 In reflecting on this section of the report, I think that it would have been 
interesting if not just inter-gang homicides were looked at, but instead, all potential violent 
interactions. That being said, I think it would be incredibly difficult to map all potential violent 
interactions, as I believe the data would not be reported in a methodical style similar to that of 
homicide reports. 
To create the visualizations of the initial gang homicide networks, data was taken from 
Chicago homicide records made between 1994 and 2006.186 Data points were coded based upon 
the situation leading to the homicide, whether motive-based (motivated by gang activity) or 
member-based (any homicide including a gang member). Though decreases in gang-motivated 
homicides were noted in four of the seven sites, there was no statistically significant evidence to 
back these decreases. The decreases could be due to a variety of reasons, but it is important to 
note and connect the lack of statistical significance to the small number of gangs analyzed within 
each site and comparison site. Auburn-Gresham experienced the largest comparative decrease in 
gang activity and gang homicide relative to its comparison site. There was a decrease in density 
network and degree centralization, though not statistically significant. Two inter-gang conflicts 
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appeared to have completely dissipated during the post-CeaseFire introduction period.187 There 
were no reciprocal murders after CeaseFire began, breaking that aspect of the cycle of violence. 
It is also important to note that these two networks, the CeaseFire and comparison, were 
structurally different, which also may have affected the data analysis. Despite these potential 
flaws in the data, all-in-all, the CeaseFire sites experienced statistically significant decreases in 
total homicides, and non-significant drops in gang homicides (See Appendix, Figure 5). I think it 
can be “easy” or second nature at some point, to some of us who read a lot of “hard science” 
research reports, to discount and overlook any data or results that are not statistically significant. 
Throughout reading this lengthy analysis, I caught myself a few times skimming through data 
after reading the words “statistically insignificant.” After recognizing that I was doing that, I 
made sure to re-read, and re-read again, as the data still is valuable and real, representing 
tangible changes in communities; whether attributable to CeaseFire’s program or not, these drops 
in homicides, in shootings, in gang activity, are all incredibly important as they demonstrate less 
harm carried out, and fewer lives lost.  
CeaseFire Outcomes 
The summative impact on CeaseFire on violent trends in the seven sites can be viewed in 
the appendix (Tables 4 and 5). Overall, there were mixed results, but some extremely successful, 
program-related decreases in shots fired and persons shot. Some data indices were more distinct 
and significant than others. Decreases were experienced in all three categories, shots fired, 
persons shot, and gun homicides, except for the data point on gun homicides in Englewood, 
which was positive.188 Looking at the summary presented in Table 5, there were overall 
decreases in violence in most aspects of each site. The NIJ/NU team concluded that “Overall, the 
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program areas grew noticeably safer in six of the seven sites, and we concluded that there was 
evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the 
introduction of CeaseFire in four of these areas.”189 
Relevance to Police Violence 
 How is this all relevant to police violence? Drawing upon the assertion made in Chapter 
Two, that police forces function as gangs, and can be classified as such, I believe that Cure 
Violence’s public health approach to reducing violence can be applied successfully to police 
violence. If individuals and networks (gangs) can be “treated for violence,” police officers and 
police forces can be too. Police are not military – they are civilians and can and should be treated 
and upheld to the same expectations as other civilians, rather than be absolved of accountability 
for their acts of harm.  
 While doing research on Cure Violence as an organization and violence prevention as a 
practice, I reached out to them to see if there had been any moves to address police or law 
enforcement violence. Unfortunately, at this point, there have been no developments of that sort 
(but I was assured it was on their minds). Though a little disappointing, the discovery left me 
with a lot of room for creativity in trying to adapt Cure Violence methodology to responding to 
police violence.  
My dream program would be instituted in every law enforcement agency in the US (and 
maybe even someday, the world!). Each location would have an employee specifically dedicated 
to responding to violent incidents perpetrated and experienced by members of the department. 
This employee would (ideally) be a social worker of sorts, trained to hold everyone accountable 
and to provide support, similar to a violence interrupter. The violence interrupter’s presence and 
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actions would serve as regular reminders to the police department that as people in power, their 
actions highly visible, and their acts of harm must be addressed and stopped. After any incident of 
an officer shooting someone, or any use of force, in any context, there would be department-wide 
discussions and acts of accountability as a response to that act of harm. Involving the entire 
department is reminiscent of including entire communities after a community member enacts or 
experiences harm. Including many people also makes it evident how violence impacts oneself and 
one’s community, even if the perpetrators themselves do not experience the direct effects. 
Additionally, it shows that the response will be maintained and will happen after each and every 
incident, demonstrating continuous responsible accountability practices. This commitment will 
also illustrate that violence is not just harmful one-on-one, but feeds into the cycle of violence. 
Dedicating the necessary time to accountability and education on tactics that are not based on 
physical force will equip officers with new tools to manage situations. Significant reductions in 
police-initiated killings have been recorded upon department-wide bans on excessive force and 
replacements of those tactics with non-violent (or less violent) practices, especially mandating 
officers to use all other means before shooting, which has shown to lead to a 25% decrease in 
police-initiated shootings. Solely requiring that all acts of force be reported has led to an identical 
decrease in police-initiated shootings (Figure 6).190 
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Figure 6. Percent fewer police killings in police departments that implemented policies of using all other 
means before shooting. 
 
Education on cultural literacy would also be integral to this program, especially the 
acknowledgement and effort towards learning about marginalized communities who 
disproportionately experience police violence, particularly black communities, indigenous 
communities, communities of color, as well as queer communities and queer communities of 
color. Equipping community members with the ability to educate officers in their communities 
could serve as a mutually empowering method of collaboration toward disrupting violence 
patterns. 
Why and How Public Health Can Reduce Violence 
The analyses of CeaseFire’s impacts on these Chicago sites (as well as the 50+ sites in 
the US, 8+ sites in Latin America, 10+ in the Middle East and North Africa, 5+ in Central and 
South Africa, and Europe)191 indicate that a public health, disease-control approach to reducing 
violence works. Nonviolent resolutions of disputes reduce the opportunity for violent responses 
to conflicts, and thus a lesser probability of violence exposure and spread. The implementation of 
programs like Cure Violence in healthcare facilities has also proven to be incredibly helpful in 
starting the process as early as possible when gunshot victims enter hospitals for treatment. 
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Healthcare professionals possess empathy and care techniques that law enforcement agents do 
not have (while on duty), and they are trained to treat and end the spread of infectious 
diseases.192 Treating an infectious disease like an infectious disease, rather than a moral battle, 
will produce results.193 Violence affects everyone’s health negatively, and is not something that 
occurs because people are “bad or immoral.”194 Violence occurs most often because of adverse 
experiences people are exposed to throughout their lives, such as (but not limited to) systematic 
racism, poverty, mass incarceration, and police brutality, all of which lead to more exposure to 
violence and subsequent transmission.195 By interacting all individuals affected by violence in a 
way similar to that of anyone who contracts a disease is treated emphasizes that treatment of 
disease works and punishment does not drive behavior or behavioral change, contrary to the 
notion focused on (and profited upon) in the US today.196 Lastly, this method is accessible, and 
these materials and supports are accessible. Reframing violence as a disease and treating 
individuals (and populations) to cure the disease can be done with grassroots efforts, from 
anywhere in the country (and world). 
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Conclusion: Where do we go from here? 
 In the US, violent behavior is popularly viewed as an individualistic problem, reflective 
of morality and personal choice. However, it is important to emphasize and give credence to the 
fact that violence is a behavior, and thus, as a behavior, is infectious. Whether we are conscious 
of it or not, violence is omnipresent in our society, constantly being spread like all biologically 
infectious disease: through repeat contact and exposure. American complacency with violence, 
paralleled with our upbringings amongst violent media and violent interactions themselves, 
makes it difficult to identify where the infection originates, and where it may end. What I hoped 
to address in this thesis is that the specific origin is unidentifiable, but at large can be attributed 
to systemic oppression, particularly racism and heteropatriarchal ideals, manifested in the US as 
law enforcement and correctional facilities. The constant presence of police in our communities, 
and their ability to act violently without accountability is a major factor leading to one’s 
exposure to violence and violent behavior, perpetuating the cycle of violence.  
 As violence is like an infectious disease, it can and should be treated like biological 
infectious diseases, with a public health approach. The public health organization Cure Violence, 
dedicated to violence prevention, outlines such a disease-control method in three steps: 
identifying present infections and providing treatment, identifying and treating high-risk 
individuals, and changing the environment to prevent further spread or reoccurrence.197,198 These 
steps parallel those presented by the WHO in regard to infectious disease control and are 
similarly successful at preventing violence.  
 Likening US police forces to gangs, as both are groups that commit violence, provides a 
context through which Cure Violence’s method can be applied. Analyses of Cure Violence’s first 
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program, CeaseFire Chicago, indicate the benefits and successes attributed to treating violence 
with a care-centered public health model. Furthermore, it demonstrates the ability to apply the 
Cure Violence approach to gang violence, setting the stage for me to present my adaptation of 
the model, targeting police forces and police violence. Creating a system of accountability and 
support for everyone who experiences or commits acts of violence is important, but 
implementing such a system at a center of power and control in the US – law enforcement – is 
paramount. Holding officers accountable for each and every act of violence, every single shot 
fired, has the potential to change policing, promoting acts of non-violence and training officers to 
exhaust all other means before exercising any use of force, thus saving innumerable lives, 
particularly the lives of young black and brown men. Teaching practices of care and 
accountability and heightening the awareness of the effects of violence to the people who 
perpetrate it have the potential to change this oppressive system. 
 The phasing-in of public health approaches dedicated to decreasing violence could lead to 
a phasing-out of the US’s prison-industrial complex and police state. This public health approach 
is humanity-centered and in the economic interest of the country. The divestment of the 
government from prisons and police can save billions; the US spends on average $182 billion 
annually on the system of mass incarceration199 – approximately one in fifteen state general fund 
discretionary dollars.200 The redistribution and rerouting of this immense amount of money could 
open up access to funds for countless new programs and supports while also providing a 
successful, harm-reductive way to curb violence. 
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It is important to acknowledge that in treating violence as an infectious disease, there 
runs the possibility of interventions devolving into practices conducive to carceral logic. 
Historically (and presently), the US has treated those with infectious diseases very poorly, 
oftentimes resulting in infected individuals being isolated and quarantined, reminiscent of 
incarceration. In my ideal actualization of this public health process, carcerality would be 
eliminated, and care would be provided in supportive, consensual ways, exercising immense 
efforts to ensure no one’s rights are being infringed on, and that people are given room to grow 
on their own terms. Additionally, by staffing these initiatives with health care providers and 
social workers, rather than police or correctional officers, I would hope that each interaction 
would occur in a way that centers survivors of violence and their experiences, while 
simultaneously holding whoever committed harm accountable. 
Centering care has the potential to change the cyclic nature of violence in the world. The 
recognition that state-initiated (police and carceral) violence sparks other violence (which in turn 
triggers more violence) can lead to increased societal accountability and supports, thus 
prompting systemic changes in our responses to violence. Making public health practices integral 
to policing could eventually lead to the mitigation of policing as an institution, allowing for 
resources to be redirected to provide care and supports in the communities most affected by state 
violence, and eventually an expansion of this support nationwide. Equipping those who commit 
harm with support services first, opposed to subjecting them to carceral violence, is integral to 
disrupting patterns and flows of violence, and those in positions of power in society – police – 
have the capability and responsibility to initiate this disruption. Violence is cyclical; whether one 
experiences or inflicts violence, it spreads through webs of interaction, infecting all those who 
come into contact with it. It is crucial for those who perpetrate violence to be held accountable, 
  
especially those in power, to fracture this cycle permanently. Violence cannot and will not end 
violence, what is needed to end violence is radical care and love. I’d like to close with an excerpt 
written by radical abolitionist and revolutionary Assata Shakur, from her autobiography: Assata. 
Her words emanate the essence of non-violent practices, of care, of peace, and the belief that 
“r/evolution is love.” 
“this is the 21st century and we need to redefine r/evolution. this planet needs a 
people’s r/evolution. a humanist r/evolution. r/evolution is not about bloodshed or 
about going to the mountains and fighting. we will fight if we are forced to but the 
fundamental goal of r/evolution must be peace. 
 
we need a r/evolution of the mind. we need a r/evolution of the heart. we need a 
r/evolution of the spirit. the power of the people is stronger than any weapon. a 
people’s r/evolution can’t be stopped. we need to be weapons of mass 
construction. weapons of mass love. it’s not enough just to change the system. we 
need to change ourselves. we have got to make this world user friendly. user 
friendly. 
 
are you ready to sacrifice to end world hunger. to sacrifice to end colonialism. to 
end neo-colonialism. to end racism. to end sexism. 
 
r/evolution means the end of exploitation. r/evolution means respecting people 
from other cultures. r/evolution is creative. 
 
r/evolution means treating your mate as a friend and an equal. r/evolution is sexy. 
 
r/evolution means respecting and learning from your children. r/evolution is 
beautiful. 
 
r/evolution means protecting the people. the plants. the animals. the air. the water. 
r/evolution means saving this planet. 
 
r/evolution is love.” 
― Assata Shakur 
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Figure 1. A selection of data exemplifying the racial gap in US police departments, with concentrations of white 
officers most often much higher than the concentration of white people in the population.201 
 
201 Jeremy Ashkenas and Haeyoun Park, “The Race Gap in America's Police Departments,” The New York Times 
(The New York Times, April 8, 2015). 
  
Table 1. Summative estimates of CeaseFire’s impacts on shots fired in various program sites.202 
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Table 2. Summative estimates of CeaseFire’s impact on persons shot in various program sites.203 
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Figure 3. Decrease in shooting hot spot densities in Auburn-Gresham.204 
 
 
204 Skogan et al., 196. 
  
 
Figure 4. Percentage change of hot spot shooting density in Auburn-Gresham.205 
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Table 3. Summative changes of CeaseFire’s effects on shooting density in multiple program sites.206 
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Figure 5. Changes in gang networks in Auburn-Gresham, before and after CeaseFire. Note: multiple inter-gang 
conflicts dissipated, and there were no reciprocal murders after the program began.207 
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Table 4. Summative impacts of CeaseFire program on violent trends in various sites.208 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Summary of specific impacts of CeaseFire on changes in violence due to the program, in various sites.209 
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